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WHERE HAVE ALL THE 
ON-LINE GROCERS GONE? 
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE 
DEMISE OF ON-LINE GROCERS
M. Theodore Farris, II 
University of North Texas
Phil Wilson
University of North Texas
Online grocer Webvan Group, Inc., fired a salvo across the shopping carts of the 
brick-and-mortar supermarket industry when it announced that within two 
years it would be delivering Web ordered groceries free-of-charge in 26 major 
markets throughout the United States (Dembeck, 1999).
~ July 14, 1999
Webvan Joins List of Dot.Com Failures: Online Grocer Burned Up $830 Million 
Since 1999 (Mangalindan, 2001).
- July 10, 2001
ABSTRACT
The grocery concept has evolved over many years to drive cost out of the process. Grocery 
margins are very thin, typically ranging from 1% to 1 1/2 % such that the grocery business 
continues to look for innovative ways to take cost out of the process. Ordering groceries on 
the Internet was initially thought to be a very promising new opportunity. So what happened 
to on-line grocers? This paper considers what went right and what went wrong for the on-line 
grocers and uncovers a few logistics lessons along the way.
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THE CHANGING FACE OF THE 
GROCERY INDUSTRY
The grocery concept has evolved over many years 
to drive cost out of the process. Consider how the 
frontier store, where the customer gave the 
storeowner a shopping list and he personally 
picked out the groceries from his shelves, gave 
way to the invention of the shopping cart in 1936 
(Wilson 1978) and the concept of allowing 
multiple customers to roam the store to pick out 
their own groceries. Not only did it lower cost 
but it allowed the grocery to handle more 
customers at the same time. The concept has 
been incorporated in virtually all the current 
models of grocery retailing from the convenience 
store to traditional grocery store to warehouse 
club. All have the common element of customer 
pick. Today, Walmart, with 2,941 stores, owns
1.6 million shopping carts where up to 550 carts 
are used at any given time (Cahill, 1999).
According to industry statistics, the average 
supermarket’s labor expense is currently about 
12 percent of sales. Of the labor expense, it is 
estimated that grocery stocking expense is about
10 percent of its labor expense, or 1.2 percent of 
sales (Anonymous, 1999). Grocery margins are 
very thin, typically ranging from 1% to 1 Wfo. 
The grocery business continues to look for 
innovative ways to take cost out of the process. 
For example, in the distribution process of the 
typical traditional supermarket, a can of tuna 
changes hands on average 14 times between the 
food-packing factory and the customer’s can 
opener. Software, networks and warehouse 
automation can reduce the tuna can’s turnover to
11 pairs of hands or fewer. This leads to lower 
costs, and, if not completely passed on to the 
consumer, to higher margins (Anonymous, 2000).
Ordering groceries on the Internet was initially 
thought to be a very promising new method to 
lower cost. People generally want convenience, 
time- and labor-saving approaches, especially in 
two-worker households where there’s little time 
for leisurely shopping. So if price, ordering, 
quality, freshness and delivery are the same with 
an Internet grocer, why not—some would
say—bypass the traditional grocery store and the 
need to traverse long aisles, line up at the 
checkout, and all that hassle (Sleeper, 1999)?
Dot.com grocers were formed anticipating that 
information flow would be a means of driving 
cost out of the process and increasing margins. 
Table 1 shows a comparison of the typical 
supermarket and an on-line grocery delivery 
model utilized by Streamline to sup-port that 
claim. A 1998 study by Andersen Consulting 
predicted that the number of households buying 
groceries on-line would reach 15 million by 2007 
(Santosus 1998). Forrester Research estimated 
that on-line grocery shopping in the United 
States would grow from $509 million in 1999 to 
$10.3 billion in 2004. Progressive Grocer (2001) 
estimates the overall grocery industry in the U.S. 
to be $494 billion, suggesting the on-line grocery 
share would grow from 0.1% to 2.1%.
TABLE 1




Cost of Goods Sold 75% 72%




Net Profit 1% 6%
* Figures compiled by Smart Store, a research and 
development initiative at Anderson Consulting (Hannu 
and Tanskanen 2001).
So what happened to on-line grocers? The most 
telling quote came from a Morningstar 
newsletter.
Peapod...reminds me of the guy who 
wants to increase his income, and takes
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out an ad offering $1.20 in return for 
every $1 bill he receives. To be sure, he’ll 
get a lot of $1 bills— his revenues, so to 
speak. The drawback is that he loses 
$0.20 on each one (Kelly, 1999).
As of this writing the financial markets for on­
line grocers have been devastated. Publicly 
traded on-line grocers have closed their doors. 
Others never reached their anticipated IPO. 
Table 2 reflects the financial results of the three 
largest publicly traded on-line grocers. 
Streamline and Webvan dissolved, and Peapod 
sold its remaining assets to Ahold NV. Another 
on-line firm, GroceryWorks, never reached the 
IPO stage, but sold its remaining assets to Tesco. 
This article considers what went right and what 
went wrong for the on-line grocers.
THE VIRTUAL SUPERMARKET
The definition of a Virtual Supermarket or on­
line grocer is a store that sells directly to end 
consumers a full range of grocery products (for 
example, fresh and frozen food, toiletry, etc.). 
Customer orders are received through the 
Internet and picked by shopping personnel or 
robots. The ordered groceries can be delivered to 
consumers or can be picked up at a customer 
collection point. The system is complemented by 
“back-office” procedures that take care of
processing customer orders, inventory, payments, 
and distribution (Anonymous 2000).
FULFILLMENT MODELS
There were two types of facilities in use; in-store 
fulfillment centers (SFC) and dedicated fulfill­
ment centers (DFC) (Anonymous, 1999). If the 
process has low volume, a SFC was the likely 
choice. The target market and desired products 
also may have dictated using a SFC. For 
example, a SFC seems to be appropriate for 
speciality and small store operations. If volume 
grows, then moving from a SFC to a DFC is in 
order. If the objective was to enter into a new 
geographical territory, or if the company was 
very optimistic about demand, a DFC was most 
likely implemented because of its anticipated 
cost and efficiency benefits (Anonymous, 1999).
It is in terms of fulfillment efficiencies that the 
models really differ. While Peapod and Tesco 
fulfilled orders out of actual stores, Streamline, 
Homerun, WebVan, and GroceryWorks relied on 
DFCs to process orders (Mathews, 1997).
In-Store Fulfillment (SFC) Model
The store pick model was pioneered by Peapod, 
which tapped into the existing logistics 
infrastructure, utilizing the retail store as the
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end distribution point. All they did was bridge 
the gap between store and home, and charge a 
premium for the service (Casper 1998). In its 
early days as a Chicago-area start-up, Peapod 
fulfilled orders by picking items from the shelf of 
a local Jewel grocery chain. Unfortunately, this 
method lost Peapod money. So, as Peapod 
expanded into other markets and increase 
volume, it switched to establishing its own 
distribution centers, another money losing 
strategy (Holst 2001). Peapod's delivery costs 
averaged about $12 per order. Recall from Table 
1 that the typical supermarket’s distribution 
costs run about 6%. A typical Peapod customer 
would spend $120 per order (Lindsay, 1999) and 
was charged a $4.95 flat monthly fee, $4.95 per 
order and 5% of the total order. (Leibs, 1997) so 
the additional cost per order averaged $13.42 or 
about 11.2%.
Peapod returned to the SFC model when it 
aligned itself with Royal Ahold to receive much- 
needed cash to continue operations. Peapod now 
uses existing Royal Ahold stores, such as Stop & 
Shop and Giant, for its inventory. It's a model 
similar to that employed by Tesco, the U.K. 
grocery giant that took a 35 percent stake in 
Safeway's GroceryWorks.com. It is likely Tesco 
will convert the GroceryWorks operations to the 
SFC model. Putting itself under the aegis of a 
brick-and-mortar grocer may help Peapod reduce 
marketing costs. Webvan spent between 25 and 
35 percent of its revenue on advertising, 
compared with about 1 percent for traditional 
grocery chains (Moore, 2001).
Dedicated Fulfillment Center (DFC) Model
The warehouse/depot model seeks to create its 
own efficient home delivery infrastructure. It 
takes the retail store out of the cost structure, 
delivering directly from the warehouse, and 
affords the opportunity to consolidate delivery of 
multiple product classes as well as services to the 
home, while creating a lower cost structure
(Casper, 1998). A typical Webvan warehouse 
cost $30 million to build (Moore, 2001).
Streamline had the most innovative approach to 
fulfillment using a DFC. A setup team was dis­
patched to a customer's house where the contents 
of the kitchen were scanned to create a personal 
shopping list, which typically accounted for 70% to 
75% of a family's weekly order. A delivery day was 
determined. The family was given a UPC code list 
as its core shopping list, plus another list of the 
products and services available through Stream­
line. To order, family members checked off from 
their core list and the additional services list to 
determine their weekly needs, which may include 
video rentals, dry cleaning and bottled water, 
among others. As long as the order was placed by 
midnight, delivery would take place by 6 p.m. the 
next day (Liebeck, 1997b).
The heart of the Streamline system was the 
Streamline “box.” This was a combination re­
frigerator, freezer/dry storage cabinet measuring 
five feet wide by five feet high by two feet deep 
that was placed in the customers' garage at no 
charge. The company operated a fleet of trucks 
that had three different temperature zones to 
maintain the integrity of the products (Liebeck, 
1997a) and make weekly deliveries to the box. 
The customer did not have to be present for 
delivery to take place.
To support their delivery model, Streamline built 
a 56,000-square-foot distribution center in 
Westwood, Massachusetts, with about 10,000 
different items in regular stock (by comparison, 
the typical supermarket carries about 30,000) 
(Leibs, 1997). Streamline customers paid a box 
installation charge of $39 and a monthly fee of 
$30 (Mathews, 1997). The average Streamline 
customer ordered goods 47 out of 52 times per 
year and spent an average of $100 per week, or 
about $5,200 per year (Liebeck, 1997a). The 
customer spent approximately 7.7% of the 
purchases on installation and monthly fees.
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ALTERNATIVE
FULFILLMENT APPROACHES
Another model, exemplified by NetGrocer, more 
closely approached the electronic commerce 
initiatives seen in other industries by 
outsourcing the delivery function to FedEx. It 
offered convenient ordering over the Internet, 
but delivery service was slower than the other 
alternatives (Casper, 1998). Natgrocer delivered 
to 49 continental states, as well as APO/FPO and 
Diplomatic Pouch zip codes (Anonymous, 2001). 
It offered 2,500 SKUs of only non-perishable 
groceries for a delivery cost of $2.99 for the First 
10 pounds and 99 cents per every additional 10 
pounds. (Liebeck, 1997b).
Webhouse Club, a subsidiary of Priceline.com, 
had buyers log on and bid for items using four 
pre-selected discounts of up to 50% on 150 
grocery items. Customers selected from two 
brands for each item and could not rank 
preferences. Customers had to accept Priceline’s 
specified quantities and the chances of having a 
bid accepted were greater if they bid higher. The 
results appeared within 60 seconds. Customers 
paid on-line using a credit card and then printed 
out a prepaid list. The customer then had to go to 
any of a number of supermarkets from 
Philadelphia to Connecticut to pick up the 
groceries. (Setton, 2000).
The most successful model to date involves an 
existing grocery chain with a strong market 
presence that develops its own on-line ordering 
system and uses its own stores as the warehouse. 
United Kingdom grocer Tesco was the company 
that "cracked the code," by discovering that if it 
rolled out small, by sending just two trucks to the 
right store, its on-line operation could be 
profitable (Mahoney, 2001). Tesco says it 
operates the largest and most successful 
Internet-based grocery home shopping service in 
the world with almost 1 million registered 
customers and processing over 70,000 orders 
each week. It is profitable with sales of about 
$420 million a year. (Macaluso, 2001).
BASICS BEHIND GROCERY LOGISTICS
Consider what the on-line grocers are up against. 
They deal with a relatively low order value 
(around $100), low margins (1%-11/2%), frequent 
replenish-ment, short shelf life with meat, 
produce, and dairy products, all shapes and sizes, 
different strategies regarding depth (defined as 
the number of different products in a line) versus 
width (defined as the number of product lines 
offered), a compressed delivery window and 
restrictions as to when the customer is available, 
varying picking costs, and specialized storage 
and transportation needs.
Quality control is a critical factor. Assume an 
on-line grocer with sales of $50 million has an 
average order size of $100. Also, assume the 
order consists of 50 items. This would require 25 
million picking transactions across 500,000 
orders. If a company were able to achieve a 
picking accuracy of 99.5%, one in four orders 
would contain an error, clearly an unacceptable 
rate from the consumer perspective, especially 
with “time-starved” consumers looking for less 
stress (Beech, 1997).
Streamline tried to capitalize on the trade-off 
between higher transportation costs and lower 
real estate costs. Streamline's DFC had real 
estate costs of about $6.50 per square foot vs. the 
supermarket's typical $18 to $24 per square foot. 
Of course, it could be argued that SFC models 
have no real estate investment since it functions 
inside existing retail units (Mathews, 1997).
CONSUMER BEHAVIOR REASONS ON­
LINE GROCERY WILL NOT WORK
An October 1999 survey by Fast Company 
revealed significant attitudinal barriers to 
buying groceries on-line. Indeed, these barriers 
were even more signi-ficant than barriers to 
other on-line activities.
Reasons for consumer resistance include the 
following:
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1. Grocery shopping is a habitual act. While the 
average consumer shops for groceries 2.2 
times per week, few consumers shop so often 
for cars, books, or airline tickets. Thus, 
grocery shopping is more habitual, and it will 
take more effort to change consumer buying 
patterns. Moreover, consumers often visit 
several stores in a week, presumably looking 
for specific items or hoping to take advantage 
of specific promotions.
2. Grocery shopping is a community act. Most 
grocery consumers shop with someone, be it 
a spouse, child, or friend. On-line grocers 
must overcome the “serious social obstacle” 
that the community function of buying 
groceries at local supermarkets—where folks 
can interact with friends, neighbors, and 
relatives—is sometimes more important than 
the inconvenience associated with filling up a 
shopping cart.
3. There is no significant time savings 
associated with on-line shopping. Excluding 
driving time, the average consumer spends 
45 minutes in his visit to the supermarket 
while the Peapod buyer spends 37 minutes.
4. Delivery is cumbersome and expensive, but 
also slow. In the age of instant gratification, 
Internet delivery will have to offer significant 
value to make up for slow delivery relative to 
traditional shopping (Jones, 1999).
LOGISTICS PRINCIPLES 
COMPONENTS THAT MADE SENSE
The principle of selective risk suggests 
designing logistics systems so that the system 
performance objectives are directly related to the 
importance of the product or customer to the firm 
(LaLonde, 1993). Streamline's research led the 
company to believe that stocking 55% of the 
currently available SKU count could cover 
approximately 90% of retail demand. This 
premise was strengthened by research showing 
that 33% of grocery shoppers accounted for 56% 
of purchases, and that 30% of customers
TABLE 3
ON-LINE USER ATTITUDES
% of Respondents % Who believe the
who never plan to following activi-
do the following ties are better
on-line on-line than the
traditional way
1% Research 87%
11% Buy airline tickets 57%
12% Buy books 38%
34% Buy cars 24%
44% Buy groceries 12%
60% View pornography 14%
Source: Jones, 1999
accounted for 73% of all branded packaged goods 
purchases (Mathews, 1997). Seventy-two percent 
of Streamline's sales came from the lower margin 
grocery category. The balance came from 
products and services, such as dry cleaning and 
specialty foods (e.g., prepared meals, buffet 
trays), on which margins are higher. For 
example, their dry-cleaning service charged 
Streamline 95 cents for shirts, which the 
company retailed for $1.50. A suit that cost 
Streamline $3.75 brought in $6.50 (Mathews, 
1997).
The principle of information selectivity has
an underlying assumption that information is as 
much of a resource to the decision maker as 
capital, human resources, and facilities. 
Information should be treated with the same 
operational, tactical, and strategic importance as 
any other resources of the firm (LaLonde, 1993). 
PeaPod recognized the capture of consumer 
usage patterns held value beyond just driving 
their delivery process. Peapod received revenue 
from selling information about its customers' 
buying habits to food suppliers (Leibs, 1997).
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The principle of transaction simplification
suggests improving the efficiency and effective­
ness of the transaction through simplification 
(LaLonde, 1993). By stocking 75% fewer stock 
keeping units, on-line grocers could achieve 
significant cost savings. The average brick-and- 
mortar supermarket stocks 40,333 items; Home- 
Grocer.com stocked 11,000 items and Peapod 
20,000 items. Lower numbers of SKUs improved 
inventory control and reduced sales lost to out-of­
stocks to typically 3.1%. Approximately 8.2% of 
SKUs in brick-and-mortar stores are out-of-stock 
at any one time, so reducing SKLU by 75% should 
have significantly improved tracking ability and 
reduced lost sales associated with out of stocks 
(Jones, 1999).
The principle of variance reduction recog­
nized that in any logistics system there are a 
series of linkages between demand and supply 
points. Failure to accurately anticipate demands 
at the next stage in the system often leads to 
erosion of system productivity. This erosion, in 
the form of excessive inventory, overtime, 
increased stock outs, or a variety of other vari­
ables, can directly effect system productivity and 
performance. This principle suggests that a 
logistics manager can significantly influence the 
productivity of the system by reducing unplanned 
variance in the system (LaLonde, 1993). 
Approximately 85% of grocery purchases are 
repetitive (Richards, 1996). Most on-line grocers 
recognized this fact and designed past-use 
libraries for their customers. This not only 
reduced the time it took to place an order after 
the initial learning curve, it served as a prompt 
to remind the customer of items they had 
overlooked.
The principle of inventory velocity suggests 
that, in order to achieve asset productivity in the 
management of inventory assets, logistics man­
agers must focus their efforts on both the level of 
inventory and the velocity of inventory (inventory 
turnover) (LaLonde, 1993). Simply put, the on­
line grocers never could reach high enough 
volumes in a concentrated area to achieve the 
efficiencies necessary for profitability. The bulky
nature of the deliveries limited Peapod’s trucks 
to about 22 daily—a fraction the number that a 
typical FedEx or UPS truck makes (Holst, 2001). 
In the entire Chicago market, Peapod conducted 
at most 1,200 transactions a day. By contrast, a 
single supermarket in that market conducts an 
average of 2,100 transactions a day (Holst, 2001).
The principle of shared/shifted risk has as its
guiding objective the shifting of the logistics cost 
structure from a fixed cost base to a variable cost 
base. By shifting costs to a supplier upstream in 
the channel (e.g., Kanban) or downstream to a 
customer (e.g., placing order by computer 
terminal), the logistics manager can shift fixed 
investment cost and risk outside the firm 
(LaLonde, 1993). While the on-line grocers were 
able to shift the ordering process to the customer, 
in return they accepted the burden of picking and 
delivery, which turned out to be a very 
inequitable and costly trade.
LESSONS LEARNED
Why did the on-line grocery concept fail? The 
demise of the on-line grocer was largely the 
result of the inability to achieve high enough 
volumes to override the additional costs of the 
on-line process. Some of these costs were start­
up related and others were inherent in the 
process. It is also possible that the enthusiasm of 
e-commerce may have allowed some critical 
oversights in strategic expansion plans.
Many differing models of grocery retailing have 
evolved over time from the convenience store to 
traditional grocery store to warehouse club. All 
have the common element of customer pick. 
Perhaps the on-line design was too radical. 
Whether using warehouse automation or 
personal shopper, the on-line grocers failed to 
keep this cost element low. Clearly the benefits 
achieved by passing off the picking process 
directly to the consumer are great. Peapod’s own 
research indicated a delivery pricing barrier of 
$10 per delivery. Attempts to incorporate a 
delivery fee covering additional costs failed.
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Quality control was a major factor. The number 
of items in the typical order exposed the process 
to one picking error out of every four orders. The 
inconvenience of an incorrect order likely 
prevented some customers from repeating the 
process.
The initial start-up cost of using an on-line 
grocer required that customers recognize the 
learning curve effect and accept this up-front cost 
in order to achieve future savings. In addition, 
consumers failed to realize the true value of their 
time or of the effort of the provider. This is not 
uncommon. Focus groups interviewed by next- 
flight-out transportation provider NextJet 
indicated they felt immediate freight services
should cost “a little more” than Federal Express 
next day. If fact, the total cost of handling a 
next-flight out shipment typically exceeds $160 
per package. Purchasing decisions based on total 
cost must correctly recognize the costs.
CONCLUSION
This article considered the changing face of the 
grocery industry. It considered the different 
types of on-line fulfillment and the basics driving 
grocery logistics. It looked at what worked and 
what did not work from a consumer behavior and 
logistics perspective. Finally it offered important 
lessons to be learned from the demise of the on­
line grocer.
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